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Systematic examination of publicly-
available information reveals the diverse
and extensive corporate political activity of
the food industry in Australia
Melissa Mialon1*, Boyd Swinburn1,2, Steven Allender1 and Gary Sacks1
Abstract
Background: The political influence of the food industry, referred to as corporate political activity (CPA), represents
a potential barrier to the development and implementation of effective public health policies for non-communicable
diseases prevention. This paper reports on the feasibility and limitations of using publicly-available information to
identify and monitor the CPA of the food industry in Australia.
Methods: A systematic search was conducted for information from food industry, government and other publicly-
available data sources in Australia. Data was collected in relation to five key food industry actors: the Australian Food
and Grocery Council; Coca Cola; McDonald’s; Nestle; and Woolworths, for the period January 2012 to February 2015.
Data analysis was guided by an existing framework for classifying CPA strategies of the food industry.
Results: The selected food industry actors used multiple CPA strategies, with ‘information and messaging’ and
‘constituency building’ strategies most prominent.
Conclusions: The systematic analysis of publicly-available information over a limited period was able to identify diverse
and extensive CPA strategies of the food industry in Australia. This approach can contribute to accountability
mechanisms for NCD prevention.
Keywords: Food industry, Corporate political activity, Non-communicable diseases
Background
In Australia, as in many countries, unhealthy diets are
one of the main risk factors for disability and deaths [1].
The food industry, represented by a diverse range of ac-
tors, is recognised as having a major influence on the
diet of the population through their products, their mar-
keting and their efforts to shape, directly or indirectly,
government policies in its favour (referred to as “corpor-
ate political activity”, CPA, defined as “corporate at-
tempts to shape government policy in ways favourable
to the firm” [2]) [3, 4]. The CPA of the food industry has
previously been categorised into six strategies, based on
well-established classifications of the CPA of the tobacco
industry: information and messaging; financial incen-
tives; constituency building; legal strategies; policy sub-
stitution; opposition fragmentation and destabilisation
[5] (see Additional file 1 for a description of each strat-
egy). There is emerging evidence and wide-spread con-
cern in the public health community that the CPA of the
food industry could pose a risk to the development and
implementation of effective policies and programs for
non-communicable disease (NCD) prevention and con-
trol [6–10]. This is of particular concern for companies
who sell products that contribute to the NCD epidemic
[4]. The CPA of the food industry is not routinely moni-
tored; however, some instances of unfavourable food in-
dustry influence (from a public health perspective) have
been described in the literature. As an example, in
Australia, a recent report suggested that industry self-
regulation (policy substitution strategy) has failed to
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protect children from marketing of unhealthy food prod-
ucts [11]. In addition, in 2014, it was revealed that close
relationships between Australian policy makers, includ-
ing a former Assistant Health Minister, and the food
industry (constituency building strategy), led to delays in
the implementation of a public education resource
designed to support a new government food labelling
initiative [12].
In order to protect public health policies and out-
comes from vested interests in the food industry, some
public health advocates have called for a strengthening
of accountability mechanisms and for more transparency
from the food industry [13, 14]. Identifying and monitor-
ing the CPA of major food industry actors has the po-
tential to contribute to these objectives, and this paper
reports on the implementation of an approach for doing
this using publicly-available information, based on
methods used to monitor CPA strategies of the tobacco
industry [5].
This study examined the feasibility and limitations of
implementing the proposed approach in Australia.
Methods
A systematic approach was implemented in Australia to
identify and monitor the CPA of the food industry, con-
sisting of a document analysis of publicly-available infor-
mation, based on methods previously used to monitor
the CPA of the tobacco industry [5].
Data collection focused on five of the most prominent
food industry actors in the country. The actors were se-
lected based on methods previously developed for moni-
toring the policies and practices of the food industry
[15], with the aim of selecting one actor from each of
the main sectors within the food industry as well as a
major trade association. Euromonitor was used for the
identification and selection of these key food industry
actors, based on their market shares in 2013 [16]. Where
the market leader in a particular sector of the industry
did not have an Australian-specific website, the next
most dominant company in that sector was selected.
The selected food industry actors included: the Austra-
lian Food and Grocery Council (AFGC) (a major trade
association); Coca Cola (including The Coca Cola Com-
pany and Coca Cola Amatil) (a sweetened beverages
company); McDonald’s (a fast-food restaurant); Nestle (a
processed food products company); and Woolworths (a
supermarket).
Systematic searches were conducted across various
sources of information [5]. Food industry materials in-
cluded country-specific website and Twitter accounts of
the selected industry actors. Government material in-
cluded websites of departments and other agencies re-
sponsible for health; websites of the Parliament and
Senate; register of lobbyists; websites of the three major
political parties; websites of commissions in charge of
elections; and official requests for information regarding
government interactions with the selected food industry ac-
tors. All searches were conducted at the national level.
Additional sources of information included the websites of:
ten major universities with a school/department of nutri-
tion/dietetics/exercise or physical activity; five major pro-
fessional bodies working on diet-, public health- or physical
activity-related issues and related annual conferences. The
selection of relevant sources was informed by a pilot study
conducted in December 2013, and made in consultation
with public health experts in Australia. Media materials,
such as Google News and media releases from the selected
food industry actors, were also analysed. Details about spe-
cific sources of information included in this study are pro-
vided in Additional file 2. Data collection was performed
between September 2014 and February 2015. For annual or
occasional events, such as submissions to public consulta-
tions, elections, or conferences, the study included the
most recent data available (up to two years retrospectively),
as detailed in Additional file 2.
A qualitative thematic analysis was performed by MM.
GS re-analysed all data for the selected food industry ac-
tors. As themes were not necessarily mutually exclusive,
any differences in coding were resolved by mutual agree-
ment. Choice of themes was inductive and based on an
existing framework for classifying the CPA of the food
industry [5]. Researchers followed an iterative process,
where the framework would be adapted to include any
new practices identified. However, no new practices were
observed as part of this project.
Illustrative examples of CPA strategies used by each
food industry actor are presented here, using the frame-
work as a guiding thread. A critical social science ap-
proach guided the conduct of this research, with the
food industry considered as a potential determinant of
health. In this context, the critical social science ap-
proach seeks to critique current social conditions as part
of efforts to improve population health [17]. Specifically,
this research is part of efforts to increase the transpar-
ency and accountability of the food industry.
Results
In total, 310 pieces of information were collected. All
references and data collected are included in Additional
file 3 (S3), with each piece of information allocated a
unique code (starting with the letter A). Table 1 presents
a summary of all practices and strategies identified dur-
ing the period of data collection in Australia.
Five of the six CPA strategies were identified through
publicly-available information: information and messa-
ging; financial incentives; constituency building; legal
strategies; and policy substitution. The constituency
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fragmentation and destabilisation strategy was not
identified in the study.
Data related to the AFGC and Nestle were predomin-
antly related to the information strategy; whereas for
Coca Cola, McDonald’s and Woolworths, it mainly re-
lated to the constituency building strategy.
Information and messaging strategy
The most frequently observed strategy during data collec-
tion was the ‘information and messaging’ strategy. This
strategy mainly consists of sharing information and fram-
ing messages that depict the industry in a positive way.
As part of the information and messaging strategy, evi-
dence was found that all five food industry actors
highlighted their economic importance in efforts to con-
vey a positive image for their industry (A21-4, A110,
A168, A202, A302-3). For example, in 2012, in its re-
sponse to a consultation on nutrition, health and related
claims, the AFGC noted that it “makes a substantial
contribution to the Australian economy and is vital to
the nation’s future prosperity” (A21). There was evidence
that the AFGC, Nestle and Woolworths promoted de-
regulation when discussing diet- or public health-related
issues (A16-20, A200-1, A308). They used different argu-
ments against proposed regulation of claims, such that it
would discourage innovation (A18, A308); that it would
be costly to the industry (the AFGC suggested that it
would “cost millions of dollars” (A16)) and be resource
intensive (A201); and that it would undermine the com-
petitiveness of businesses (A19, A201). Apart from this
consultation, the AFGC also suggested that “regulation
should be imposed only where necessary to correct mar-
ket failure and that it should be sufficiently flexible to
encourage innovation” (A18).
Data illustrated that all five food industry actors framed
the debate on diet- and public health-related issues in
ways that: shift the blame away from the food industry in
the NCDs epidemic (the food industry actors rather fo-
cused on personal responsibility and on the lack of phys-
ical activity); promote the good intentions and stress the
good traits of the food industry (for example, the fact that
the food industry ensures food safety); emphasise the food
industry’s actions to address public health-related issues
(including the fact that the food industry promotes health-
ier lifestyles; stress that the food industry is an important
part of the solution, is an expert on diet- and public
health- related issues, and provides healthy/healthier ver-
sions of its products) (Table 2). The AFGC, Coca Cola
and Nestle were found to use this practice most actively of
the selected food industry actors.
Table 1 Summary of CPA practices identified in Australia
Strategy Practice Australian Food
and Grocery Council
Coca Cola McDonald’s Nestle Woolworths Total
(occurrences)
Information and
messaging
Lobbying 0 1 1 1 1 4 148
Stress the economic
importance of the industry
4 1 1 1 2 9
Promote de-regulation 5 0 0 2 1 8
Frame the debate on diet-
and public health-related issues
12 19 4 13 3 51
Shape the evidence base on diet
and public health-related issues
14 9 2 51 0 76
Financial incentives Financial incentives 2 5 0 0 5 12 12
Constituency building Establish relationships with key
opinion leaders and health
organisations
0 1 0 9 3 13 127
Seek involvement in the community 2 46 26 10 12 96
Establish relationships with
policymakers
11 0 1 3 3 18
Establish relationships with the
media
0 0 0 0 0 0
Legal strategies Use legal action (or the threat of)
against public policies or opponents
0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Influence the development of trade
and investment agreements
1 0 0 0 0 1
Policy substitution Policy substitution 6 1 3 10 2 22 22
Opposition fragmentation
and destabilisation
Opposition fragmentation
and destabilisation
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total number of CPA practices identified 57 83 38 100 31 310 310
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Table 2 Mechanisms and arguments used by the sample of food industry actors to frame the debate on diet- and public health-related issues in Australia
Australian Food and
Grocery Council
Coca Cola McDonald’s Nestle Woolworths
Mechanisms Arguments Example of arguments identified during data collection
Shift the blame
away from the
food industry
Personal responsibility –
people need to have
a balanced diet and
there are no bad food
products, only bad diets
“[There is a] well established
paradigm that an individual’s
good health is dependent
upon a balanced diet” (A26)
“Coke can be consumed
as part of a sensible,
balanced diet” (A113)
“[When kids eat a] mix
of foods – (…) does it
balance out with (…)
energy requirements?”
(A175)
“The basic principle in nutrition
[is] that there are no ‘good’ and
‘bad’ foods but rather ‘good’
and ‘bad’ diets” (A203)
“The importance of a
balanced diet” (A304)
Personal responsibility –
people need to be more
active and balance
kilojoules in and out
(focus on obesity rather
than NCDs)
“The health risks associated
with obesity are largely
controlled if a person is
physically active and
physically fit” (A29)
“We know that you’ve
got to balance kilojoules
in with kilojoules
out” (A111)
“If your school or club
(…) requires equipment,
uniforms or something
else that encourages
participation in sport,
we are happy to help”
(A171)
The Nestle Healthy Kids Program
contains a lot of information
on physical activity (A205)
Not identified
Promote the
good intentions
and stress the
good traits of the
food industry
Industry provides
safe products
“AFGC advocates a positive
role for the food, beverage
and grocery industry in
providing safe products to
consumers” (A32)
Not identified “Providing customers
with safe food is our
first priority and our
most critical responsibility”
(A172)
“As an industry, we’re showing
we’re credible partners, going
beyond using our scientific
knowhow to put micronutrients
safely in a product and ensure
they’re preserved until the end
of its shelf life” (A194)
Not identified
Emphasise the
food industry’s
actions to
address public
health-related
issues
Industry promotes
healthy lifestyles
“The food industry [is] already
actioning plan to (…)
encourage healthy
lifestyle choices” (A35)
Not identified “Mac Pack: a sporting
movement for kids
promoting healthy
living through fun
and play” (A169)
“The Nestle Good Life Program
is a group of community initiatives
(…) promoting active
lifestyles” (A206)
Not identified
Industry is part of
the solution
“Obesity and overweight is a
major issue globally. (…) AFGC
and the entire food and grocery
manufacturing industry are
committed to being part
of the solution to this critical
issue” (A 32)
“We just want to
be part of the
solution” (A111)
Not identified “We believe that we have a
shared responsibility” (A207)
“We have an important
role to play in promoting
balanced and healthy
eating habits that
support a healthy
lifestyle” (A304)
Industry is an expert in
diet- and public health-
related issues
Not identified Not identified Not identified “To have the greatest possible
impact [with our Nestle Good
Life Program], we focus on areas
where we believe we can add the
most value: food, nutrition, and
health and wellness. These are areas
where we can best contribute our
expertise, scientific insight and
decades of experience” (A206)
Not identified
Industry provides healthy/
healthier versions of its
products
“To help people achieve this
balance, industry provides a
range of nutritious products,
in a variety of portion sizes
with low-joule, low-fat,
“We continue to make
positive changes. Here’s
just a taste of what
we’ve achieved.
1. Increasing the
Not identified Not identified “We have already made
significant steps to
promote healthy diets
to Australian shoppers”
(A304)
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Table 2 Mechanisms and arguments used by the sample of food industry actors to frame the debate on diet- and public health-related issues in Australia (Continued)
low-sugar and low-salt
foods available” (A32)
availability of our
smaller portion sizes.
2. Offering more
low kilojoule
options”(A115)
Personal responsibility –
Industry provides
information
“We aim to empower people
and communities to make
informed choices to improve
the health of their families”
(A31)
“More information
equals more informed
consumers, and we
believe informed
consumers are the ones
that make the best
decisions for themselves
and their families”
(A121)
“Happy Meal Choices
menu (…) enables
parents and children to
select meal components
to suit individual tastes
and dietary requirements”
(A170, A178)
“Nestle aims to help parents
and children make healthier
choices, running cookery
schools and educational
programmes around
the world” (A213)
“We strongly believe our
customers should have
access to a full suite of
nutritional information to
enable them to make
informed decisions when
selecting groceries”
(A306)
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The data showed that four of the five food industry ac-
tors shaped the evidence base on diet- and public health-
related issues so that it would favour the industry, as illus-
trated in Table 3. Publicly-available information revealed
that the AFGC and Nestle have been funding their own re-
search, and have been actively promoting it to the public.
For example, the AFGC retweeted a message saying that
“regularly eating #cereal4brekkie is assoc. w lower BMI &
lower risk of being overweight or obese in adults & kids”
(A46). The study mentioned was funded by the AFGC it-
self, through a third party, the Australian Breakfast Cereal
Manufacturers Forum (#cereal4brekkie). The AFGC, Coca
Cola and Nestle also promoted research that was funded
by the food industry (directly or indirectly, through third
parties) or where authors had ties with the industry, as
well as non-peer reviewed or unpublished evidence (such
as information extracted from poster presentations from
conferences) (A40, A42, A44, A46, A135, A231, A234-8,
A249, A256-9, A261, A268). For example, in its response
to a public consultation on the draft for the Australian
Dietary Guidelines and for the Australian Guide to
Healthy Eating, the AFGC referred to research that had
ties with Dairy Australia, the Australian Beverages Coun-
cil, Coca Cola or Meat and Livestock Australia (A39). All
food industry actors, except Woolworths, were found to
have sponsored or presented their work in major scientific
events or conferences on diet- or public health- related is-
sues. For example, Coca Cola sponsored a session on
weight loss maintenance during the 2014 Nutrition Society
of Australia Annual Scientific Meeting (A133). The AFGC,
McDonald’s and Nestle provided education materials to
schools, parents and the public more generally (A49,
A158, A160, A175, A206, A210, A224, A227, A229-30,
A233-8). Nestle, on its “Nestle Healthy Active Kids” web-
site, provided detailed information on physical activity
(A204, A225), while its “Healthy Active Kids Booklet” con-
tained recipes promoting the company’s products (A224).
Nestle also organised events in supermarkets during
school holidays in which people could receive advice from
dietitians, as well as free diabetes testing performed by the
Australian Diabetes Council (A228). They could also
“learn how Nestlé products are the ideal partners to help
you invite more fresh food into your diet” (A228).
The only evidence that the selected sample of food in-
dustry actors were formally lobbying policy makers was
contained in the Australian public Register of Lobbyists.
All companies, except the AFGC, were registered as clients
of lobbying businesses (A130, A173, A216, A307). How-
ever, the nature of the register did not allow any examin-
ation of the extent, timing or nature of lobbying activities.
Financial incentives strategy
The financial incentives strategy, through which the indus-
try provide funds (and other incentives) to policy makers,
was identified in Australia through the companies’ annual
reports, the annual returns of political parties, the Register
of Members of the Parliament’s Interests and Freedom of
Information logs. These documents revealed that the
AFGC, Coca Cola and Woolworths regularly donated
funds to Australian political parties (A14-5, A105-9, A297-
301). Coca Cola, for example, donated AUD 55,000 to the
Australian Labour Party and to the Liberal Party of
Australia for the financial year 2013-14 (A108-9).
Woolworths’ political contributions exceeded AUD
35,000 in 2014 (A297).
Constituency building strategy
There was evidence that all food industry actors in-
cluded in the sample have established relationships with
various health organisations, community groups, and
policy makers.
Publicly-available information showed that Coca Cola,
Nestle and Woolworths have established relationships
with health organisations. Partners included the Sports
Dietitians of Australia (A104); the Dietitians Association
of Australia (A188-9, A195); the Heart Foundation
(A192); the Glycemic Index Foundation (A188, A191,
A196); and Nutrition Australia (A292-3).
The food industry actors also sought involvement in
the community, and examples identified in Australia
during data collection are presented in Table 4. Coca
Cola developed an initiative to promote physical activity
for kids, called “The Happiness Cycle”, in partnership
with an Australian charity (A111). This could also be
classified as a “framing” practice, since Coca Cola af-
firmed that the initiative was part of a program to “help
curb obesity” and that the company wanted “to be part
of the solution” (A111). In October 2014, McDonald’s
promoted its annual “Mc Happy Day”, during which
AUD 2 were donated to its charity (Ronald McDonald
House) for every purchase of a specific burger (A141).
McDonald’s also supported a number of physical activity
initiatives, and there was evidence that some of these
initiatives helped the industry to promote its brand. For
example, children wear red and yellow equipment with
the McDonald’s logo and played with the Ronald McDo-
nald mascot as part of the Mac Pack Basketball Super
Clinic (A144) and the Swimming Queensland partner-
ship (A149).
There was evidence that all food industry actors, ex-
cept Coca Cola, developed relationships with policy
makers in Australia. The “Australian Food and Health
Dialogue” is an example of a public-private initiative in
which food industry actors have the opportunity to
interact with government officials (A5-6, A140, A167,
A176, A274, A294-5). In parallel, in October 2014, a
Senator and two Members of Parliament participated in
the “AFGC Annual Industry Leaders Forum”, held in
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Table 3 Mechanisms used by the sample of food industry actors to shape the evidence base on diet- and public health- related issues in Australia
Australian Food and Grocery Council Coca Cola McDonald’s Nestle Woolworths
Mechanisms Examples identified during data collection
Fund research,
including through
academics, ghost
writers, own research
institutions and
front groups
Promotion (industry website, Twitter,
etc.) of research from a front group:
“This review was commissioned and
paid for by the Australian Breakfast
Cereal Manufacturers Forum of the
Australian Food and Grocery
Council.” (A40)
Not identified Not identified “[The] Nestle Research Center
(NRC) (…) 250 scientists publish
some 200 peer-reviewed scientific
publications each year across
areas including nutrition and
health, public nutrition and
food consumer interaction.”(A257)
Not identified
Pay scientists as
advisers, consultants
or spokespersons
Not identified “Coca-Cola Australia has an advisory
council of experts in the area of obesity,
public health and nutrition, who provide
advice and counsel to the Company”
(A139)
Not identified Not identified Not identified
Cite research that
has been funded
(directly or indirectly,
through third parties)
by the industry
AFGC submission to the draft Australian
Dietary Guidelines and Australian Guide to
Healthy Eating: references research funded
by the food industry (or with authors that
have declared interests with the food
industry): Dairy Australia, Australian
Beverages Council, Coca Cola, Meat
and Livestock Australia. (A39)
“While they contribute minimal kilojoules
to the diet, people question the role
of diet soft drinks when managing
their weight. […]A new study funded
by the American Beverage Association
and published in the journal Obesity
may just have provided evidence
to suggest otherwise.” (A134)
Not identified “[A] recent study carried out by Zurich’s
ETH University and Nestle (…) showed
that serving school-age children a greater
variety of vegetables increased the
quantity they chose to consume.” (A257)
Not identified
Disseminate and use
non-peer reviewed
or unpublished evidence
Not identified 'Infographics on sweeteners on industry
websites contain evidence that has
not been peer reviewed (e.g., Calorie
Control Council) (A135)
Not identified Nestle Australia Response to Australian
Dietary Guidelines - Incorporating the
Australian Guide to Healthy Eating -
Draft for Public Consultation (2012)
includes information drawn from a
poster presentation (A215, A268)
Not identified
Participate in and host
scientific events
Dietitians Association of Australia 31st
National Conference - Sponsored Breakfast
Seminars: Healthier Australia
Commitment (A38)
2014 Nutrition Society of Australia
Annual Scientific Meeting - session
sponsored by Coca Cola - “Do
small changes make a big difference?
Insights into weight loss maintenance
research.” – Presented by: Professor
James Hill, Denver University,
USA (A133)
Dietitians
Association of
Australia 31st
National
Conference -
Exhibitors:
McDonald’s
Australia
Dietitians Association of Australia 31st
National Conference - Sponsored Breakfast
Seminars: Nestle Corporate: “Unlocking the
facts on kid’s snack habits” (A217)
Not identified
Provide industry-
sponsored education
materials
“Details of planned activities for the
Dietary Guidelines Work Program -
Communication and Implementation
Plan 2012: AFGC (…) indicated that
they will have some of their own
educations initiatives developed by
May 2012” (A49)
Not identified McDonald’s
junior
development
basketball
programs in
partnership
with Basketball
Victoria: School
resources -
lessons plan
(A175)
Nestle Healthy Active Kids“with resources
for teachers […]. As part of the program
[Nestle] distributed 80,000 Kids Nutrition
Plates, 50,000 Healthy Active Kids booklets
and as a result was able to reach 5,000
teachers and 250,000 school children.” (A224)
Not identified
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Table 4 Community initiatives supported by the sample of food industry actors in Australia
Australian Food and
Grocery Council
Coca Cola McDonald’s Nestle Woolworths
Type of
activity
supported
Population
targeted
List of community initiatives identified during data collection
Physical
activity
Under 18s Not identified 1.Sport Camps Australia (A59)
2.Get Involved (Australian Paralympic
Committee) (A74)
3.Happiness Cycle (A111)
4.University of South Australia
(SA)’s Football United Program (A103)
1.Macca’s Grassroots
Western Australia
(WA) (A143)
2.Mac Pack Basketball
Super Clinic (A144)
3.Little Athletics WA (A148)
4.Macca’s Cup – Under 18s
SA National Football League
competition (A150)
1.Cricket Australia (A179)
2.Swim Kids Operation
10,000 (A181)
Not identified
All ages Not identified 1.Ride2Work Day (A76) 1.Swimming Queensland
(A149)
Not identified 1.Tennis Australia (A289)
Other health-
related
initiatives
Under 18s Not identified 1.Youth Focus (A61)
2.Ronald McDonald House
Charities (A80)
1.Ronald McDonald House
Charities (RMHC) (A141)
1.School Canteen
Association (A186)
1.Countdown Kids Hospital Appeal (A280)
2.Variety, the children’s charity, New South
Wales (NSW) and Australian Capital Territory
(A280)
3.Children’s Hospital Foundation,
Queensland (A280)
4.Royal Children’s Hospital Foundation,
Victoria and Tasmania (A280)
All ages Not identified 1.Red project (HIV) (A73) 1.Association for the Blind
of WA (A151)
2.Lifeline WA (A157)
3.Telethon, WA (A152)
4.Cystic Fibrosis fundraising
event “Great Strides” (A156)
Not identified 1.Avner Nahmani Pancreatic Cancer
Foundation (A280)
2.Royal Flying Doctor Service, SA and
Northern Territory (A280)
3.Telethon, WA and Queensland (A280,
A285)
4.Bundaberg Health Services
Foundation (A290)
Education Under 18s Not identified 1.Top Blokes Foundation (A65)
2.Wirrpanda Foundation (A66)
3.AIME (A77)
4.Street University (A70)
5.Galilee School (A75)
6.Australian Indigenous
Mentoring Experience (A83)
7.Stacy’s New School (A90)
Not identified Not identified 1.Earn & Learn (A280)
All ages Not identified 1.Mum’s School (A64)
2.Enactus program (A78)
3.Charitable Foundation for
Books (A67)
1.The Charlie Bell Scholarship
for Future Leaders (A147)
Not identified Not identified
Other All ages 1.Foodbank Australia
(hunger relief) (A9)
2.Arnott’s Foundation
1.Red Shield Appeal, Salvation
Army (poverty relief) (A58)
2.Mission Australia (poverty
relief) (A79)
1.Salvation Army Youth
Camp, WA (poverty relief)
(A153)
2.McDonald’s Community
1.Foodbank Australia
(hunger relief) (A182,
A184)
2.World Wild Fund Pakistan
1.Foodbank Australia (hunger relief) (A281)
2.Salvation Army (poverty relief) (A280-1)
3.Love Food Hate Waste, NSW
(environment) (A279)
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Table 4 Community initiatives supported by the sample of food industry actors in Australia (Continued)
Gala Ball & Charity
Auction (A2)
3.Keep Australia Beautiful
(environment) (A60)
4.Landcare Australia
(environment) (A88)
5.Bushfires in Victoria
(natural disaster) (A88)
6.Cana Farm, NSW (social) (A63)
7.Brotherhood of St. Laurence
African Australian Community
Centre, Victoria (social) (A68)
8.Graffiti artists (art) (A62)
9.Beacon Foundation
(youths) (A83)
10.Clontard Foundation (youths) (A83)
11.Jack’s House program (youths) (A72)
12.Marist Youth Care Centre, Victoria
(youths) (A69, A98)
13.Fitted for Work (employment)
(A86, A99)
Cinemas (social) (A145)
3.Earth Hour, WA
(environment) (A155)
4.Clean up Australia, WA
(environment) (A154)
(environment) (A183)
3.Cyclone Marcia, Queensland
(natural disaster) (A184)
4.Nestle Golden Chef’s
Hat Award (cooking) (A180)
5.Tamworth Local Aboriginal
Land Council (aboriginals)
(A185)
4.Bushfires and drought (natural
disaster) (A280)
5.Fundraising BBQs (social) (A282)
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Parliament House in Canberra (A9). Discussions in-
cluded topics such as “industry engagement in the polit-
ical process”. Another forum was planned for October
2015, with the aim to “engage with senior Federal Minis-
ters to better understand government policy direction
and how business and government can work in partner-
ship” and to “promote the interests of [the food] indus-
try in the development of policy [and] to showcase the
Australian food, beverage and grocery industry to high
level stakeholders” (A11). Policy makers themselves also
proactively engaged with the food industry in Australia.
The then Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, in his speech
during the 2014 AFGC Annual Industry Leaders Forum,
declared ““I (…) promised that we would cut red tape –
and that indeed is happening” (A13). Some Members of
Parliament also declared shareholdings in Coca Cola and
Woolworths.
Legal strategies
This study did not find evidence that the selected food
companies used legal strategies in this area, through chal-
lenging public policies or its opponents in court. However,
there was an indication that the food industry attempts to
influence the development of trade and investments
agreements. For example, on the AFGC’s website, one of
the media releases revealed that “the AFGC has, and con-
tinues to, engage on the range of trade negotiations under-
way calling for improved outcomes on processed and
semi-processed agri-food products.” (A51).
Policy substitution strategy
During data collection, all food industry actors were found
to use the policy substitution strategy, which consists of
proposing voluntary initiatives and self-regulation as part of
efforts to avoid the introduction of mandatory regulation.
The “Food and Health Dialogue” (A5-6, A140, A167, A176,
A274, A294-5), the “Responsible Children’s Marketing Ini-
tiative” (A54) and the “Quick Service Restaurant Initiative
for Responsible Advertising and Marketing to Children”
(A54, A176-7) are examples of voluntary initiatives involv-
ing the food industry. The AFGC also welcomed the fact
that the “Health Star Rating System” for food products la-
belling was proposed as a “voluntary scheme with an ex-
tended, five year, implementation period, [that could]
coexist with the industry supported Daily Intake Guide and
other existing front of pack labelling schemes” (A56). The
AFGC, McDonald’s and Nestle promoted their efforts to
reduce the amount of salt, sugar or fat in their food prod-
ucts (which could also be considered as a “framing” prac-
tice) (A178, A269, A271-2, A276-7, A310).
Opposition fragmentation and destabilisation strategy
In Australia, the opposition destabilisation and fragmen-
tation strategy was not observed during data collection.
Discussion
This study found evidence that major Australian food in-
dustry actors engage in diverse and extensive practices
which can have an influence on public health policies and
programs. The evidence, identified from publicly-available
information only, related mostly to the ‘information and
messaging’ and ‘constituency building’ CPA strategies.
This study revealed that different actors employed dif-
ferent practices during the data collection period. The
AFGC and Nestle made extensive use of the ‘information
and messaging strategy’, particularly by framing the debate
and shaping the evidence base on diet- and public health-
related NCDs. In contrast, Coca-Cola, McDonald’s and
Woolworths focused more on their involvement in the
community. It is not clear whether these observed differ-
ences are ‘accidental’ or if they reflect fundamental differ-
ences between these companies and the environments in
which they operate. While differences in management
philosophies, competitive pressures in the different sub-
sectors of the food industry, and public perceptions are
likely to influence the activities of each food industry
actor, the reasons that they adopt particular strategies war-
rant detailed investigation.
This study is, to the authors’ knowledge, the first at-
tempt to use a systematic approach to identify and
monitor CPA strategies of the food industry in Australia
and other high-income countries (HICs). The study was
able to identify a seemingly large and diverse number of
activities that can be classified as CPA. It can be ex-
pected that this systematic approach could be similarly
employed in other countries with similar political sys-
tems to monitor food industry CPA in those countries.
Most of the strategies and practices identified by this study
were similar to strategies previously identified as being used
by the food industry in other countries [6–9]. The findings
also reflect strategies used by actors in other industries, such
as the alcohol and tobacco industries [4, 18–20].
This study has a number of limitations.
Most notably, the study only collected publicly-available
information. Due to the nature of CPA, publicly-available
information is likely to give an incomplete picture of the
full range of practices adopted by the food industry.
Lobbying of policy makers, for example through personal
connections, gifts and other private interactions are not
readily documented in the public domain. Interviews with
key stakeholders in the food system and/or a focus on spe-
cific case studies, such as specific public health policies or
specific periods of time, could help identifying CPA in a
more comprehensive way. Additional sources of informa-
tion, such as social media platforms, crowdsourcing of in-
formation, or whistle-blowers forums, could also be added.
Moreover, the timing of data collection may have had an
impact on the information identified by this study. The
data provides only a snapshot of activities employed, but
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does not provide an indication of how these activities vary
over time. It could be expected that food companies adopt
different strategies according to different political climates.
For example, the ‘policy substitution’ strategy may be more
likely to be employed when major public health- or diet-
related policies are proposed or developed in a given coun-
try, and the ‘financial incentives’ strategy may be more
prevalent in the lead up to an election. Longer periods of
monitoring over multiple time periods, supplemented by
specific detailed case studies, are likely to improve our un-
derstanding of CPA strategies employed by food compan-
ies over time.
Future investigations could focus on a broader range
and a larger sample of food companies, or could focus
on the international practices of the food industry actors
selected for this study, using their global websites. The
activities of third parties that have direct financial or legal
associations with the five food industry actors included in
this study were not monitored per se, although a list of
‘front groups’ that have direct ties to the industry were
identified during the study (Additional file 4) and their ac-
tivities monitored to some extent. Other third parties,
such as public relations firms paid by food companies and
that might lobby politicians on behalf of the company, for
example, were not included in this study.
There are also a number of limitations with the data
sources used. For example, in Australia, declarations of
donations to political parties only include amounts
“above the disclosure threshold for the financial year
($12,400 for 2013-14)” [21]. Moreover, the Australian
Register of Lobbyists only includes names of lobbyists
and of their employers, but, unlike the lobby register in
the United States, it does not provide additional details
[22], such as the number of meetings between lobbyists
and politicians, the amount spent on lobbying activities,
or the nature of issues being lobbied. For these sources
of information, more detailed reporting would improve
transparency and enable more informed monitoring.
While Freedom of Information (FOI) requests are rec-
ommended to be used as part of the methods for sys-
tematic identification and monitoring of CPA strategies
[5], in Australia, the use of FOI requests to obtain infor-
mation about government interactions with industry
stakeholders only revealed very limited relevant informa-
tion. This is likely to have been due to the requested in-
formation being considered by government officials as
commercially sensitive and, therefore, to be redacted in
documents obtained through FOI requests.
For other sources of information, such as industry web-
sites, a large amount of relevant data was available, and
time constraints forced the researchers to collect only il-
lustrative examples for each practice and for each actor.
There is, therefore, scope for conducting detailed case
studies for specific industry actor, specific food products,
or specific diet- or public health-related issues, which
could complement the proposed systematic identification
and monitoring of the CPA of the food industry.
Importantly, the information identified in this study only
indicates that the food industry actors have employed the
practices identified. The study is not able to assess the in-
tentions behind the use of these practices. Indeed, it is
common in the business literature to discuss these activ-
ities using terms such as ‘corporate social responsibility’,
‘shared value’, partnerships, and public relations [23–25].
In conducting our analysis, our focus is on the potential
risk to public health from these activities.
The study is not able to indicate the influence of the
identified practices on the community, on public health
advocates and researchers, on policy makers, and, ultim-
ately, on the policy process. The specific details of the
way in which different industry practices have an influ-
ence needs to be the subject of further investigations.
For example, researchers could investigate the way in
which Coca-Cola’s involvement in the community affects
policy makers’ positions on specific policy issues, such
as restricting marketing to children.
This research contributes to INFORMAS (Inter-
national Network for Food and Obesity/NCD Research,
Monitoring and Action Support) – an initiative that aims
to monitor and benchmark public and private sector ac-
tions to create healthy food environments and reduce
obesity and NCDs [26]. Data collected as part of this study
adds to the growing literature on corporations and public
health [3, 4, 18, 27–32], supplements projects that moni-
tor the CPA of other industries in relation to public health
[27, 33–35] and can inform public health advocates and
policy makers about the practices employed by food in-
dustry actors. Increased awareness of the potential risks to
public health from these practices can lead to measures to
increase transparency in this area (for example, better dis-
closure of financial contributions to political parties) or to
limit industry involvement in policy development pro-
cesses. This type of research could also contribute to exist-
ing efforts to monitor corporate behaviour, such as the
work undertaken by the Center for Responsive Politics,
Corporate Accountability International and Corporate
Europe Observatory [36–39]. While the implementation
of this monitoring approach is relatively low cost, close
links with established civil society organisations would im-
prove the sustainability of ongoing monitoring.
Conclusions
This study was able to reveal important details on the
CPA strategies used by major food industry actors in
Australia, even though data was collected for a limited
period of time, and results presented are unlikely to be
comprehensive.
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Implementing the systematic approach to identify and
monitor the CPA of the food industry could help
strengthen accountability mechanisms by highlighting
the strategies of the food industry and its relationships
with governments and other civil society groups. Ultim-
ately, improved disclosure and accountability could help
to protect public health policies and outcomes from
conflicted commercial interests in the food industry.
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